A small RSA example.

```
> p := 79; q := 131; p := 79 q := 131
```

p and q are randomly chosen primes. In RSA we should take p as follows: Take a random integer p larger than 10^100.

If p is not prime, take another random integer (repeat this until p is prime).

Do the same to get q.

In RSA we should take e as follows: take some random big integer e.

If gcd(e,phi) is not 1 then take another random e (repeat until gcd is 1).

isolve = find all integer solutions of that equation (this uses the Euclidean Algorithm).

There is one free variable Z1. We get a solution of d*e + t*phi = 1 for any integer value of Z1.

We're only interested in one solution, so we substitute some integer (namely 0) for Z1.

```
> subs(_Z1=0,%);

{d = 5887, t = -7166}

> d := 5887;

d := 5887
```

Now we turn text to a number as follows:

```
a = 01 b = 02 c = 03 ... i = 09 ... z = 26 A = 27 B = 28 ... H = 34 ... Z = 52
```

So the message "Hi" becomes 3409.

```
> m := 3409;
m := 3409
```

Now the public key is this:

```
> public := [n, e];
public := [10349, 12343]
```

and the private key is this:

Anyone has access to the public key, so anyone can use the public key to encrypt messages.

The message m, and the encrypted message is m^e mod n.

```
ightharpoonup c := m^e \mod n; c := 6062
```

This c is now transmitted over the internet. Anything that goes over the internet is easy to wiretap. So eavesdropping is easy, however, an eavesdropper won't get the message m = 3409 = Hi

Instead, the eavesdropper sees only c = 6062.

How to decrypt the encrypted message c using the private key? Well, $m = c^d \mod n$.

```
> c^d mod n; 3409
```

So given the encrypted message c, we can decrypt it and get the original message m = 3409 = Hi Why can't an eavesdropper do the same, why can't an eavesdropper also compute c^d mod n and thus find m? Well, the public information is only n and e. But d is not public, it is private information. The numbers p, q and phi should also be kept a secret.

To compute d, we used the number phi, and to compute the number phi, we needed to know p and q. For an eavesdropper to compute d, he'd have to figure out what p and q are. Now n = p*q and n is public information. So if the eavesdropper can factor n, then he can find p and q, then he can find phi = (p-1)*(q-1) and then he can find d in the same way as we did.

The security of RSA now hangs on the following: if we choose very big (more than 10^100) random prime numbers p and q, and we take $n = p^*q$, and we make n public, then it is very difficult to factor this big number n, so an eavesdropper can not find p and q even though $n=p^*q$ is public information.