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Jan Rychtář


Speaker: Jan Rychtář
Title: Game-Theoretical Models of Stealing Behavior
Affiliation: The University of North Carolina, Greensboro
Date: Friday, March 22, 2013
Place and Time: Room 101, Love Building, 3:35-4:30 pm
Refreshments: Room 204, Love Building, 3:00 pm

Abstract. Models of stealing behavior typically contain at least two types of individuals, those that have a valuable resource (such as food) and those that don't. Those without a resource may try to steal from those that have it; and those with a resource may try to defend it, which then results in fights. The individual's optimal behavior depends on the behavior of others and the situation is thus fit for game-theoretical modeling. We will present two models which differ in the type of resources. An "apple model" assumes that resources are continuously used by owners; a "shell model" assumes that resources have to be prepared before one can use them. The shell model is symmetric in a sense that neither individual knows how much longer the resource has to be handled; the apple model contains potential asymmetry in the sense that only the owner may know the true remaining value of the resource. We find that this asymmetry of information often appears to favor the challenger despite the fact that it possesses less information than the owner.